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TonTs-FAMILY RELATIONsmP-CHILD's RIGHT To REcoVER FOR ENTICEMENT
-OF PARENT FROM HoMB-Plaintiff, a six year old girl, sued to recover damages
alleged to have been sustained as a result of defendant's enticing her mother from
the family home. Plaintiff contended that as a child and member of the family she
had a legally protected right to maintenance of the family relationship. Defendant
answered that no tort had been committed, since no right in the plaintiff was
recognized at common law and that to recognize such a right would amount to
judicial legislation. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appealed.
Held, affirmed. Allowing a child a right of action against one enticing his parent
from the home neither changes any rule of law nor upsets any precedent. Miller v.
Monsen, (Minn. 1949) 37 N.W. (2d) 543.
Although many legal writers discuss the existence of a relational interest,1 the
common law gives a child little or no remedy for interference with the parel!tal

1 Pound, "Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations," 14 MICH. L. RBv. 177 at
185 (1916); Green, "Relational Interests,'' 29 ILL. L. R.Bv. 460 at 484 (1934); PoLLOCK,
TORTS, 14th ed., 180 (1939); PROSSER, ToRTS 937 (1941).
,.
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relation. 2 In line with this common law view, the child has been denied recovery
for enticement of his mother from home or for alienation of her affections. 3 In
1945, however, a case appeared allowing recovery against one who intentionally
interfered with the family relationship.4 There has been slight recognition of the
new cause of action, 5 but it has been completely adopted in at least one other
instance, 6 and the principal case terms these two previous decisions "the better
considered authorities." The decisions disapproving or ignoring these cases reiterate the common law view, but the significant fact is that prior to the last four
years there was no precedent for giving the child a right of action, while, today,
there appears to be a trend in the direction of the principal case. Three arguments
against allowing the action are advanced by courts and various writers: (1) the
action for alienation of affections is based upon the loss of "consortium," the right
to which arises solely from the marriage relation and may be claimed only by the
husband or wife; 7 (2) recognition of the action opens courts to a "Hood of litigation";8 and (3) the new action undermines, or at least is contrary in spirit to, the
recent anti-''heart balm" legislation.9 The only argument that merits serious consideration10 is the last. 11 It is a grave question whether or not it is wise for courts
to enforce the right of action in the face of recent legislation. 12 It is submitted that
2 3 BLAcKSTONll, Co:MM. 143; PRossER, ToRTs 936 (1941).
3 MoRRow v. YANNANTUONO, 273 N.Y.S. 912 (1934); Cole v. Cole, 277 Mass. 50,
177 N.E. 810 (1931), but cf. Coulter v. Coulter, 73 Colo. 144, 214 P. 400 (1923), where
the court held that an adult was not entitled to damages for alienation of his mother's affections in absence of any allegation that he was entitled to her support.
4 Daily v. Parker, (C.C.A. 7th 1945) 152 F. (2d) 174; commented on in 59 H.mv. L.
R.Ev. 297 (1945).
5 See McMillan v. Taylor, (App. D.C. 1946) 160 F. (2d) 221; Taylor v. Keefe, 134
Conn. 156, 56 A. (2d) 768 (1947); Ruclley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App. (2d) 454, 190 P. (2d)
984 (1948); Garza v. Garza, (Tex. 1948) 209 S.W. (2d) 1012.
6 Johnson v. Luhman, 330 ill. App. 598, 71 N.E. (2d) 810 (1947). The Johnson case
comes closer to a recognition that destruction of the family unit is a separate tort than does
the Daily case. In the latter, loss of support was pleaded, but in the Johnson case support was
being provided and the decision rests squarely on alienation of affections.
7 Cases cited in 42 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, §665 (1944).
8 Morrow v. Yannantuono, supra, note 3; 83 Umv. PA. L. R.Ev. 276 (1934) (accepting
the argument); 20 CoRN. L. Q. 255 (1935) (rejecting the argument).
9 94 Umv. PA. L. R.Ev. 437 (1946); 46 CoL, L. R.Ev. 464 (1946).
10 There need be no "consortium" because the right of action is founded on an invasion
of relational interests of the child in the family entity. This may be a counterpart in the child
of the husband-wife "consortium," but it is sufficiently distinct to found a cause of action.
See note 1, supra. The courts fear that the action would open them to complaints by all who
are even slightly embarrassed as a result of the enticement. Restricting the action to the
number of minor children living at home at the time of the enticement, and not extending it
to collateral relations, would hardly result in a "flood of litigation." The principal case allows
the two other minor children similar recovery.
11 In 1935, the Indiana legislature passed the fust of many statutes abolishing the cause
of action for alienation of affections in hope of curtailing the blackmail peculiar to that action.
See Feinsinger, "Legislative Attack on 'Heart Balm'," 33 MicH. L. R.Ev. 979 (1935). With
the exception of the lliinois statute, 38 h.L. R.Ev. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1947) §§246.1-246.6,
the constitutionality of the statutes has been uniformly upheld. But cf. Wilder v. Reno,
(D.C. Md. 1942) 43 F. Supp. 727.
12 See comment in 162 A.L.R. 824 et seq. (1946). The trend seems toward further
anti-''heart balm" statutes, already numbering close to twenty.
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it is wise. A parent is given an action for the enticing away of his child.18 More
persuasive than this argument, however, is the argument emphasizing the change
in the family relationship.14 The child is the last member of the family group to
gain protection of the law in his own right. A recognition of a child's rights leads
logically to the position taken by the principal case. Moreover, this basis of decision
dispenses with the necessity of resorting to confusing fictions.15 In the absence of
statutes to the contrary, the child should be given an action against an outsider
enticing his parent from home.16
William H. Lowery

18 45 L.R.A. (n.s.) 867 (1913). Since it was formerly held that a parent must show
actual or constructive loss of services, no corresponding loss could be shown by the child and
recovery was denied in this converse situation. PnosSER, TonTs 916 (1941). Under what
is termed the "modern rule," no loss of services need be shown and the way is clear for the
child to seek recovery for loss of companionship, the present basis of the parent's action.
72 A.L.R. 847 (1931).
14 The Daily and Johnson cases are thus decided in the belief that the common law must
grow apace.
15 After the Daily case, writers justified the decision on the theory of interference by
an outsider with the contractual relation. See,forexample, 13 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 375 (1946).
16 But, cf. 28 NEll. L. REv. 457 (1949).

